Georgia Law Review
Volume 52

Number 4

Article 5

2018

Constitutional Preservation and The Judicial Review of Partisan
Gerrymanders
Edward B. Foley
Ohio State University Moritz College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Judges Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons

Recommended Citation
Foley, Edward B. (2018) "Constitutional Preservation and The Judicial Review of Partisan Gerrymanders,"
Georgia Law Review: Vol. 52: No. 4, Article 5.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol52/iss4/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University
of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more information, please
contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

Foley: Constitutional Preservation and The Judicial Review of Partisan G

CONSTITUTIONAL PRESERVATION AND
THE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PARTISAN
GERRYMANDERS
EdwardB. Foley*
This Essay makes three contributions to the debate
over whether the Constitution contains a judicially
enforceable constrain on gerrymanders. First,it directly
tackles the Chief Justice'sfear of thejudiciaryappearing
partisan,observing that the same fear would exist if the
Constitution explicitly banned gerrymanders and
explaining why an implicit ban should be no less
judicially enforceable than an explicit ban under
Marbury v. Madison. Second, invoking the idea of
"institutionalforbearance" in the important new book
How Democracies Die, the Essay shows how the
Elections Clause can be construed to protect
congressional districting from abuses of legislative
discretion committed by state legislatures. Together,
these two points lead to a third: the most essential duty
of the Court, according to originalist theories of
constitutional interpretation, is to preserve the
Constitution against changes that would undermine its
Charles W. Ebersold and Florence Whitcomb Ebersold Chair in Constitutional Law, and
Director, Election Law @ Moritz, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. I thank
the editors and participants of this symposium for their helpful conversations, especially
Jowei Chen, Lori Ringhand, and Franita Tolson. In addition, I am very much indebted to a
series of interlocutors concerning the idea of "structural originalism" and its relationship to
the issue of gerrymandering, including Josh Douglas, Rick Hasen, Earl Maltz, Rick Pildes,
Mike Pitts, Michael Ramsey, Mike Rapaport, Nick Stephanopoulos, Chris Walker, and most
especially Richard Fallon and Larry Solum. As a result of these exchanges, I need to develop
the idea of "structural originalism" more systematically than it can be developed here, as well
as compare it to other forms of originalism and theories of constitutional interpretation.
Please note also that this essay was written while Gill v. Whitford and Benisek v. Lamone
were pending before U.S. Supreme Court. Those cases have now been decided, although the
narrow procedural grounds on which both decisions rested leave open the merits presented
in both cases as well as the constitutional status of partisan gerrymandering generally.
Consequently, the analysis and arguments presented in this essay remain very much
germane, as litigation over partisan gerrymandering moves forward in these cases and
others.
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provisions or its overall core commitment to the creation
of a federal republicfor the United States; thus, insofar
as virulent gerrymanders increasingly threaten the
measure of popular sovereignty that elections to the
federal House of Representatives were designed to
achieve, the preservationist function of originalism
requiresjudicial invalidationof those gerrymanders.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Originalism, at its heart, aims at the preservation of the existing
Constitution.1 For this reason, originalism is a theory about
2
appropriate and inappropriate forms of constitutional change.
Originalism condemns "living constitutionalism" theories that
permit the Supreme Court, under the guise of constitutional
interpretation, to update the Constitution in a way that deviates
from its original meaning.3 This kind of judicial updating is an
improper method of constitutional amendment, and is inconsistent
with the method of constitutional amendment expressly set forth in
4
Article V of the Constitution itself.
This preservationist core of originalism, however, does not
dictate specifically how best to interpret the Constitution in order
to serve this preservationist function. With respect to many
constitutional issues that arise in litigation, there are both broader
and narrower understandings of the Constitution's original
meaning that the judiciary could adopt. 5 In some instances, the
Jamal Greene cites Randy Barnett as the leading originalist who links this theory of
interpretation to its preservationist function. Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO.
L.J. 657, 672 n.77 (2009) (citing RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE

PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 91 (2004)); see also Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter
and
the
Spirit: A
Unified
Theory
of
Originalism
(Jan.
17,
2018),
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3049056 (articulating a "good faith" or fiduciary approach to
interpretation designed to "preserve" the legal instrument, in this case the constitutional law,
that was originally adopted). Others have noted that Edwin Meese, whose 1985 speech
vaulted originalism into mainstream saliency, has also justified originalism for its essentially
preservationist role. See, e.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalismas a PoliticalPractice:
The Right's Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 552-53 (2006) (quoting and citing
multiple Meese writings).
There are many different versions of originalism, and some who consider themselves
originalist may not agree with how I characterize the essential features of originalism. While
exploring nuances must await future work, I hope those who read this essay will appreciate
that the core impulse of originalism is fidelity to the existing Constitution coupled with a
belief that this fidelity requires identification and enforcement of the Constitution's meaning
at the time of its promulgation as law. Larry Solum labels these two core commitments of
originalism the Constraint Principle and the Fixation Thesis.
See, e.g., Originalist
Methodology, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 269 (2017).
2 See Stephen E. Sachs, Originalismas a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 817, 818 (2015) (explaining that the theory is "a particular way to understand where
our law comes from, what it requires, and how it can be changed.").
3 See William Baude, Originalism as a Constraint on Judges, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2213,
2213-14 (2017). Baude credits Justice Scalia as emphasizing this key aspect of originalism.
4 Id. at 2213; see also U.S. CONST. art. V.
The theoretical debates among those who consider themselves originalists is intense and
shows no sign of diminishing. There are those who tend to follow more narrow forms of
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narrower understanding might be the one that best serves the
preservationist purpose of originalism. That view is the one that
Chief Justice Roberts expressed in his dissent in Obergefell v.
Hodges, the gay marriage case.6 But there are also other occasions
when the broader reading of the Constitution is the one most
consonant with preservation of the Constitution as originally
adopted. The Court's condemnation of the Sedition Act of 1798 as7
contrary to the First Amendment in New York Times v. Sullivan
exemplifies how the Court's broader reading of the constitutional
text, rather than a narrower one that was equally available,8 is more

originalism, often associated with "specific intent" or "original expected application"
conceptions (which the earliest versions of originalism emphasized), whereas more recent
theories have gravitated to broader versions, endeavoring to identify and follow the true
"meaning" of whatever principle originally was adopted regardless of how its authors
specifically understood that principle. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah M. Begley,
Originalism and Same-Sex Marriage, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 648, 649-50 (2016). For a useful
(and still fairly recent) summary of these debates, see generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT,
STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, THOMAS D. ROWE, JR. & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL
THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES (4th ed. 2013).
6 From his very first words, Chief Justice Roberts made abundantly clear that the
preservationist function of originalism was at the core of his Obergefell dissent:
Petitioners make strong arguments rooted in social policy and
But this Court is not a legislature. whether
considerations of fairness ....
same-sex marriage is a good idea should be of no concern to us. Under the
Constitution, judges have power to say what the law is, not what it should
be.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 U.S. 2584, 2611 (2015). Later on in the dissent, Chief Justice
Roberts elaborated that broadly interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment to permit the Court
to correct previously unrecognized "injustice" would be "dangerous for the rule of law." Id. at
2622. He explained: 'The purpose of insisting that implied fundamental rights have roots in
the history and tradition of our people is to ensure that when unelected judges strike
down democratically enacted laws, they do so based on something more than their own
beliefs." Id. at 2622-23. Consequently, he closed with a blunt lament that the Court had
subverted, not preserved, America's Constitution: "If you are among the many Americansof whatever sexual orientation-who favor expanding same-sex marriage, by all means
celebrate today's decision.... But do not celebrate the Constitution. It had nothing to do
with it." Id. at 2626.
7 376 U.S. 254, 273-74 (1964). Much of contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence
has followed from that originalist condemnation: '"With the decision in New York Times v.
Sullivan, a sea change began in the law of the First Amendment." ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE

NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 234 (1991).

8 A narrower interpretation available to the Court would have been that the "freedom of
speech, and of the press" protected by the First Amendment bars only prior restraints, not
subsequent punishments, and thus does not reach libel laws. Judge Posner has noted the
pedigree of this narrower interpretation based on an assessment of what was understood by
"freedom of speech" in the eighteenth century. ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 610 (7th Cir.
2012) (Posner, J., dissenting).
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preservative of "a republican form of government" 9-in which
opponents of the existing regime are not punished for voicing their
dissent, and which the original Constitution ordained for the United
States. 10

Broader and narrower understandings of the Constitution's
original meaning are also available with respect to the issue of
whether partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional. The key
question for an originalist approach to this issue is which type of
understanding, broader or narrower, is most consistent with the
preservationist function of originalism in this particular context.
This Essay will address this key question. It will do so in three
parts. First, it will tackle the concern expressed by Chief Justice
Roberts that the invalidation of a gerrymander as unconstitutional
might cause the public to perceive the Court as tainted by partisan
bias.
This concern can be understood as rooted in the
preservationist function of originalism-since it would be contrary
to the original conception of the judicial role as depicted in Marbury
v. Madison,11 whereby the Court is the impartial enforcer of what
the text of the Constitution requires, if the Court decided
constitutional cases based on partisanship (or if the public so
believed).
But this preservationist concern must be balanced
against another: that the Court's refusal to invalidate a partisan
gerrymander will cause the public to lose faith with "republican
form of government" altogether, thereby undermining the original
Constitution's basic objective of sustaining that form of government.
Thus, the key question remains whether the preservationist
function is better served by a narrower or broader reading on the
specific issue of partisan gerrymanders.

9 The Constitution expressly requires the United States to "guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
10 Soon after New York Times v. Sullivan was decided, it was heralded as having accurately
captured "the central meaning" of the First Amendment. Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York
Times Case: A Note on "the Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SUP. CT. REV.
191, 208 (1964). I have previously discussed the Court's originalist methodology in Sullivan
and the relevance of that methodology to the constitutionality of gerrymandering. See
Edward B. Foley, Wechsler, History, and Gerrymandering, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 11, 2017;
symposium contribution), http://www.scotusblog.com]2017/08/symposium-wechsler-hist orygerrymandering/; see also Edward B. Foley, The Gerrymander and the Constitution: Two
Avenues of Analysis and the Quest for a DurablePrecedent, 59 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1729
(2018).
11 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) ("Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by
the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.").
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The second part of this Article will pursue an alternative way
that the preservationist function might address the problem of
partisan gerrymanders. Reflecting the goal of limiting the judicial
role as much as possible consistent with the overall commitment to
the preservationist mission, this alternative approach employs the
Elections Clause in Article I of the Constitution. 12 It is built upon
the idea that, while Congress retains the ultimate power under that
clause to protect congressional elections from state laws inimical to
maintaining "a republican form of government" (as the original
Constitution is designed to do), the Court can assist Congress in the
exercise of this power by nullifying state laws antithetical to the
very premises of the Elections Clause itself.1 3 This nullification of
antithetical state laws under the Elections Clause would be
analogous to so-called "dormant" Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
whereby the Court invalidates state laws inconsistent with the
basic reason why Congress was given the power to regulate
interstate commerce, which was protecting free trade from
protectionist state laws.1 4 But just as Congress retains the ultimate
authority to use its Commerce Clause power to approve state laws
that the Court wrongly condemns as protectionist, so would
Congress-under this analogous interpretation of the Elections
Clause-retain the ultimate authority to approve of state laws that
the Court wrongly condemned as inconsistent with the basic goal of
popular sovereignty.

12 The Elections Clause provides: 'The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such regulations .... U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 4, cl.1.
13The fundamental purpose of direct elections to the federal House of Representatives was
to guarantee a measure of popular sovereignty in the system of checks and balances that
James Madison and his fellow Founders were building into the new national government for

the United States. See JACK N. RAvOKE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE

MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 221-22 (1996) (discussing principles of representation
invoked by the Framers during debates); EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE
RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 174 (1988); GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 553 (1969) ("[T]he House of

Representatives, was 'to be the grand depository of the democratic principle of the
Government' and thus was to be elected directly by the people.").
. 14

See 2 BORIS I. BITTKER & BRANSON P. DENNING, BITrKER ON THE REGULATION OF

INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE § 6.01[A] (2017) (noting that the Commerce Clause
"was not merely an authorization to Congress to enact laws for the protection and
encouragement of commerce among the States, but by its own force created an area of trade
free from interference by the States").
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This much more circumscribed role for the Court under the
Elections Clause would go far to alleviate the Chief Justice's fear of
the Court acting undemocratically, or usurping the appropriate role
of the political branches, in redistricting litigation. If the Court
acted contrary to congressional will concerning the nullification of
state laws drawing districts for congressional elections, Congress
immediately could supersede the Court's ruling, thus assuring that
the Court's ruling was democratically accountable. The Court's
ruling would stand only if Congress itself accepted the Court's
judgment that the state laws in question had been antithetical to
the popular sovereignty that the Elections Clause exists to
implement.
This interpretation of the Elections Clause, moreover, solves a
puzzle at the heart of Justice Anthony Kennedy's troubled
concurrence in Vieth v. Jubelirer.15 There, Justice Kennedy saw
partisan gerrymandering as an abuse of legislative discretion, but
he did not see a way to judicially invalidate the abuse if the
Constitution committed redistricting to legislative discretion
without an obvious standard for judicial oversight. 16 But as long as
Congress has the power to adopt and revise standards for curbing
abuses of legislative discretion when states draw congressional
districts, as Congress undoubtedly does, then any interim standards
that the Court identifies do not hamstring legislative discretion
inappropriately.
Rather, judicial nullification of a state's
congressional map on this kind of "dormant Elections Clause"
grounds is simply a signal from the Court to Congress,
Hey, Congress, we think this state has drawn its
congressional districts in a way that subverts the very
purposes of congressional elections, and thus we are
blocking the state from using this map without explicit
congressional approval, but obviously if you want the
state to be able to use this map, then you are entirely
free to express that approval, and we will honor your
congressional judgment on the best way to hold
congressional
elections
consistent
with
the
Constitution's basic goal that those elections operate
15 541 U.S. 267, 316 (2004).

16 Id. at 308 (observing that "[a]bsent sure guidance, the result from one gerrymandering
case to the next would likely be disparate and inconsistent").
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democratically to reflect the sovereign will of the
American electorate.
The third part of this Article then steps back to examine more
broadly how the preservationist function at the core of originalism
relates to protecting American democracy from increasingly
virulent threats. Judicial fidelity to this preservationist function
may occasionally put the Court in a less than comfortable role. The
Pentagon Papers Case,17 justly celebrated in the new Steven
Spielberg film The Post,18 is an obvious example. The Court
understandably would prefer to avoid passing judgment on whether
publication of a "top secret" study of the Vietnam War would
endanger national security, as claimed by the Government itselfincluding a threat to success in the war that remained very much
underway. Moreover, as the film vividly depicts, the case was before
the Court at a time when the war was a hotly disputed political
issue, with the Nixon Administration on one side and "Flower
Power" protesters on the other. Adjudication of the case put the
Court squarely into the heart of the raging political controversy. 19
Yet, as uncomfortable as it was, adjudicating the case was
mandated by the Court's preservationist duty. And history has
shown that the Court's vindication of the First Amendment claim in
that case, giving the New York Times and the Washington Post the
right to publish the papers (without being subjected to a prior
restraint in the form of an injunction), was one of the most
significant and democracy-preserving exercises of the Court's duty
under Marbury v. Madison to uphold the requirements of the
20
Constitution that make the United States a republic.

17

New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

18 Manhola Dargis, In "The Post" Democracy Survives the Darkness, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21,

g-tom2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/21/movies/the-post-review-steven-spielber
hanks-meryl-streep.html (providing an overview of the film)..
19 See, e.g., Harry Kalven, Jr., Foreword: Even When a Nation is at War, 85 HARV. L. REV.
3, 25 (1971) (noting that the "new Court could not avoid being involved centrally in a great
national political struggle and spectacle"); see also GEOFFREY STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE
SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION AGCT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 509 (2004)

(explaining that the case was so important and pressing that the Court scheduled an
unprecedented Saturday morning session to hear oral arguments).
20 See FLOYD ABRAMS, THE SOUL OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2017); see also STONE, supra

note 19, at 509-12 (noting that the decision was so unprecedented and pivotal that each
Justice wrote an opinion).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2022

9

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 4 [2022], Art. 5

1114

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1105

The current problem of computer-assisted gerrymandering run
amok calls upon the Court to exercise a similar democracypreserving role, however uncomfortable it may be, as mandated by
the Court's obligation under Marbury v. Madison to enforce the
Constitution's original requirement that elections to the U.S. House
of Representatives be responsive to the changing will of the
American electorate.
II. THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S CONCERN FOR THE APPEARANCE OF
JUDICIAL PARTISANSHIP

At the oral argument in Gill v. Whitford,2 1 Chief Justice Roberts
voiced the concern that the Supreme Court would appear partisan
if it interpreted the Constitution to invalidate partisan
gerrymanders. 22 In questioning Paul Smith, the counsel for
plaintiffs in Gill, the Chief Justice expressed particular concern in
this respect about the plaintiffs preferred metric for identifying a
partisan gerrymander, known as the "Efficiency Gap" or "EG."23
The Efficiency Gap directly measures the phenomenon of "packing"
and "cracking" that makes gerrymanders effective: lumping
excessively large numbers of an opposing party's voters into fewer
districts, so that these extra voters are useless in winning
legislative seats, or dispersing an opposing party's voters among
multiple districts so that they cannot win any of them.24 Here is
how Chief Justice Roberts put his point:
And if you're the intelligent man on the street and the
Court issues a decision, and let's say the Democrats win,
and that person will say: Well, why did the Democrats
win? And the answer is going to be because EG was
greater than 7 percent, where EG is the sigma of party
X wasted votes minus the sigma of party Y wasted votes
over the sigma of party X votes plus party Y votes.
No. 16-1161.
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 37-38, Gill v. Whitford (No. 16-1161) (remarking
that "politics is a very important driving force and those claims will be raised").
22 See id. at 38 (expressing that a ruling based on an EG "doesn't sound like language in
the Constitution").
24 1 have discussed the Efficiency Gap in detail elsewhere. See Foley, The Gerrymander
and the Constitution, supra note 10, at 7-11 (providing a numerical example); Edward B.
Foley, Due Process, Fair Play, and Excessive Partisanship,84 U. CHI. L. REV. 655, 669-70
(2017) (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the metric).
21
22

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol52/iss4/5

10

Foley: Constitutional Preservation and The Judicial Review of Partisan G

2018]

CONSTITUTIONAL PRESERVATION

1115

And the intelligent man on the street is going to say
that's a bunch of baloney. It must be because the
Supreme Court preferred the Democrats over the
25
Republicans.
The concern in the way that the Chief Justice expressed it is
obviously valid: the average American is not going to understand
what the Efficiency Gap is or how it relates to the Constitution, and
thus easily could be suspicious that invocation of the Efficiency Gap
by the Court to invalidate a gerrymander is mere camouflage for a
partisan motive.
A. MARBURYAND THE ENFORCEMENT OF AN EXPLICIT ANTIGERRYMANDERING CLAUSE

Is the Chief Justice's concern limited to the Efficiency Gap, or
does it extend instead to the entire enterprise of invalidating a
partisan gerrymander as contrary to the Constitution? To consider
this question, suppose the Constitution actually contained an
explicit clause prohibiting partisan gerrymanders. For example,
consider this possible text (which indeed could be proposed if the
Court rules that the Constitution as currently written contains no
judicially enforceable constraint on partisan gerrymandering):
In the drawing of districts for legislative elections,
either to Congress or a state legislature, no district shall
be a gerrymander designed to give a political party an
electoral advantage apart from what would exist if
districts were drawn according to geographical and
other nonpartisan districting criteria.
If the Constitution contained this provision, then the Court
presumably would be required to enforce it just like the First
Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, or other existing
constitutional provisions, pursuant to the Court's duty to enforce

25

Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, Gill v. Whitford (No. 16-1161).
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the Constitution as the "supreme law of the land" 26 under the
27
doctrine of Marbury v. Madison.
To be sure, the Chief Justice still would have reason to be
squeamish about enforcing this hypothetical clause if it were part
of the Constitution. There still would be the danger that the Court
would appear partisan in the enforcement of the clause. As drafted,
the language of this hypothetical clause is not self-enforcing. In a
particular case, it easily could be disputed whether the legislative
map at issue was, or was not, infected with an unconstitutional
partisan gerrymander.
If the Court, enforcing this clause,
invalidated a disputed map drawn by Republicans and thus ruled
in favor of the Democrats, the proverbial "man on the street" still
might wonder whether the Court ruled for the Democrats because
of the Court's own partisan preference rather than the Court's
nonpartisan obedience to the command of the Constitution.
This danger would diminish to the extent that the Court could be
capable of unanimity in its enforcement of the hypothetical clause.
Given a Court populated with five appointees of Republican
presidents and four Democratic appointees, were all nine Justices
to invalidate a map as a pro-Republican gerrymander biased
against Democrats, it would be more difficult for the intelligent
"man on the street" to accuse this unanimous Court of invalidating
the map because of its own pro-Democrat bias (rather than because
of its faithfully obedient enforcement of what the Constitution as
written requires). But if the Court divided 5-4 over whether or not
to invalidate a map as a partisan gerrymander, with the five
Republican appointees all in favor of upholding a Republican-drawn
map and all four Democratic appointees in favor of invalidating it,
the average American easily might be suspicious that partisan
preferences (rather than good-faith, nonpartisan disagreement over
what the Constitution commands) accounts for this judicial divide.
The same point, of course, would apply if the Court split 5-4 along
the same partisan lines to invalidate a map drawn by Democrats, or
if a future Court with five Democratic appointees and four
26 U.S. CONST. art. V, cl. 2 ('This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding." (emphasis added)).
27 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 146 (1803) (relying on the Supreme
Clause to justify the Court's power to invalidate an Act of Congress as unconstitutional).
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Republican appointees split 5-4 along party lines to invalidate a
Republican map.
The degree of the Chief Justice's squeamishness in enforcing this
hypothetical clause presumably would depend on the extent to
which the Court could develop intermediary judicial doctrines for
enforcing the clause-doctrines which would reduce the risk of the
Justices dividing over the constitutionality of specific maps attacked
in litigation.28 For a variety of reasons, the Efficiency Gap might
not be the most attractive candidate to serve as this kind of
intermediary doctrine. 29 Its lack of immediate accessibility to the
average American, for one thing, might make it relatively
undesirable in this respect. Other possible intermediary doctrines,
including those that focus on the visible distortion or disfigurement
of district lines caused by partisan gerrymanders, would be more
intuitive and thus accessible to average Americans-and, for this
reason, be less likely to arouse suspicion if invoked by judges as
grounds for invalidating a district as an unconstitutional
30
gerrymander.
28

Richard Fallon has rigorously analyzed the idea that judicial enforcement of the

Constitution requires the development of intermediary doctrines beyond just interpreting the
words of the Constitution's text. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE
CONSTITUTION (2001).
29 I've previously explored some of the deficiencies of the Efficiency Gap. See, e.g., Foley,
The Gerrymanderand the Constitution,supra note 10, at 10 ("The problem with [the gap] is
that some degrees of partisanship, even beyond considerations of geography, are
); Foley, Due Process, Fair Play, and Excessive
constitutionally permissible ....
Partisanship,supra note 24, at 670 (explaining that an efficiency gap may still statistically
exist, absent partisan gerrymandering).
30 For reasons I have explained elsewhere, when members of the public think about the
evil of gerrymandering, they visualize grossly distorted districts. See Foley, The Gerrymander
and the Constitution,supra note 10, at 28 (noting that disfigurement of districts is something
the public can easily understand). Indeed, when NPR asked a plaintiff challenging the
constitutionality of North Carolina's congressional districts to describe what makes
gerrymandering "illegal" and not just "unfair," the plaintiff immediately responded: "The fact
that the lines drawn in my state snake around in the strangest ways." The plaintiff went on
to describe a "Gerrymander 5K' road race, for which the route traversed the distorted lines
of the district:
[W]e had people run and walk along the dividing line that separates the 10th
and 11th districts, and people were going through neighborhoods. They were
sneaking and snaking around little streets and alleys. And this was the
congressional boundary. You know in your gut there is something wrong
with this.
Ari Shapiro, Plaintiff in N.C. Gerrymandering Case Speaks About Judges' Decision, NPR
2
(Jan. 10, 2018, 4:27 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/10/577163 11/plaintiff-in-n-cgerrymandering-case-speaks-about-judges-decision. Another NPR story has further details,
with an accompanying map, of the "Gerrymander 5K' route. See generally Laurel Wamsley,
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The Chief Justice could let his squeamishness lead him to refuse
to enforce this hypothetical clause altogether even though
(hypothetically of course) it is included as a written element of the
Constitution and thus part of the "supreme law of the land." Such
a refusal would entail judicial invocation of the Political Question
Doctrine to bar judicial enforcement of a constitutional provision.3 1
It is a rare and radical move, in tension with the basic judicial
obligation under Marbury v. Madison to enforce the Constitution as
written. 32 But it has occurred occasionally in the past. For example,
it caused the Court to render the Republican Form of Government
33
Clause judicially unenforceable.
Theoretically, Robert Bork invoked something like the Political
Question Doctrine to declare that the Ninth Amendment must be
judicially unenforceable even though it is obviously included as a
textual component of the Constitution. 34 For Bork, the Ninth
Amendment's inevitable unenforceability was rooted in the
philosophical proposition that natural rights were nonexistent, or
at least not objectively and thus judicially identifiable, even if the
authors of the Ninth Amendment believed in their existence.3 5 By
analogy, one might claim that the hypothetical antigerrymandering clause-even though expressly included in the
Constitution-is inherently incapable of nonpartisan enforcement

Not-So-Fun Run: Joggers in 'Gerrymander5K'Must Run Oddly Shaped Route, NPR (Oct. 30,
2017, 6:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/10/30/560909678/not-so-funrun-gerrymander-5k-joggers-trace-asheville-s-electoral-districts.
31 For an important new contribution to the scholarly literature, endeavoring to make
sense of the Political Question Doctrine, see John Harrison, The Political Question Doctrines,
67 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 460 (2017) (describing the doctrine as a composite of two distinct subdoctrines).
32 See id. ("Non-judicial finality is very much the exception and not the rule, and when the
political question doctrine is properly understood it will rarely be found to be applicable.").
" Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), reviewed the relevant history. For a new challenge
to that history, arguing instead precedent does not necessarily require all claims under the
Republican Form of Government Clause to be nonjusticiable, see Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost
History of the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908, 1932 & n.129 (2015).
34 Judge Bork described the Ninth Amendment as the equivalent of a text whose content
has been obscured by an inkblot. Kurt Lash, Of Inkblots and Originalism: Historical
Ambiguity and the Case of the Ninth Amendment, 31 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL. 467, 467 (2008).
35 Bork famously put his view on this point in 1971 in his critique of Griswold v.
Connecticut: "Where constitutional materials do not clearly specify the value to be preferred,
there is no principled way to prefer any claimed human value to any other." Robert H. Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1971); see
generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990).
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and thus must remain judicially unenforceable in order to protect
the judiciary from becoming mired in partisan bias.
To hold this, however, would be an extreme position. Too
extreme, I suspect, for the Chief Justice. Writing for the Court in
Zivoto/sky v. Clinton,36 Chief Justice Roberts rejected the argument
that the Political Question Doctrine barred the Court's adjudication
of whether Congress had unconstitutionally intruded upon
presidential power by requiring "Israel" to be identified on the
passport of an American citizen born in Jerusalem. In so holding,
Chief Justice Roberts began with this pertinent observation: "In
general, the Judiciary has a responsibility to decide cases properly
before it, even those it 'would gladly avoid.'-37 The adjudication of
constitutional questions, the Chief Justice further observed, often
requires policing the conduct of the political branches of
government, "but"-the Chief Justice continued in terms directly
avoid their
cannot
relevant
to gerrymandering-"courts
responsibility
merely 'because the issues have political
implications.'",38
There are only two "narrow" situations in which it is appropriate
to invoke the Political Question Doctrine, Chief Justice Roberts
explained. 39 The first is when the Constitution itself makes clear
that, as an exception to Marbury v. Madison, the constitutional
40
question is one for another branch of the government to decide.
That situation applies, for example, in the context of impeachments,
because the Constitution specifically says that the Senate has the
"sole" power to try all impeachments. 41 But this situation would not
apply to the hypothetical anti-gerrymandering clause, which would
operate as an explicit constitutional constraint on legislative power
in the same way that the First Amendment or the Equal Protection
Clause do and thus would be susceptible of judicial interpretation
and enforcement in the same way as those clauses are. To be sure,
it is often hard to know whether a piece of legislation abridges "the
36 566 U.S. 189, 191 (2012) ('The courts are fully capable of determining whether this
statute may be given effect .... ").
37 Id. at 194 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821)) (emphasis added).
38 Id. at 196 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 943 (1983)) (emphasis added).
39 Id. at 195.
4o Id.

41 See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993) (holding the claim
nonjusticiable); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ("Senate shall have the sole Power to try
all Impeachments.").
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freedom of speech"-another constitutional term that is not selfdefining-but that difficulty does not negate the judicial obligation
to interpret the First Amendment and to enforce its prohibition
against laws abridging the "freedom of speech" as the judiciary
understands the meaning of that term. 42 So too, it would be, with
the hypothetical anti-gerrymandering clause.
The other narrow situation in which the Political Question
Doctrine, rather than the conventional Marbury duty of judicial
enforcement, applies is if the constitutional text is not susceptible
of any "judicially manageable standards" for its enforcement. 43 This
point is one about basic feasibility. The Court literally cannot
enforce that which it utterly lacks the capacity to discern. This
point is what Judge Bork was saying about the Ninth Amendment:
if it is a sheer impossibility to identify what unenumerated rights
are deserving of constitutional protection, then the judiciary must
abdicate its otherwise existing Marbury responsibility to identify
these rights in accordance with the textual command to do so. 44
Impossibility supersedes obligation with respect to this particular
piece of constitutional text, despite the general expectation that it,
like other parts of the Constitution, is subject to judicial
enforcement.
But confined to sheer impossibility, this prong of the Political
Question Doctrine is narrow indeed. Vagueness in a constitutional
clause, or difficulty in its interpretation, is not appropriate ground
for invoking the Political Question Doctrine. Many, maybe even
most, domains of constitutional jurisprudence suffer from difficult
line-drawing problems or other vagueness pitfalls. Obscenity is one
especially notorious example in First Amendment law. 45 But so too

42 For an early and influential analysis of the difficulty in generating and applying judicial
doctrines to implement the First Amendment, see Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 877 (1963) ("[N]o really adequate or
comprehensive theory of the [F]irst [A]mendment has been enunciated, much less agreed
upon.").
43 Zitovsky, 566 U.S. at 195. See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable
Standards and ConstitutionalMeaning, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1275, 1331 (2006) ("If a judicially
manageable standard cannot be devised, the political question doctrine applies, and cases
must be dismissed as nonjusticiable.").
44 See Bork, supra note 35, at 8 ("Where constitutional materials do not clearly specify the
value to be preferred, there is no principled way to prefer any claimed human value to any
other.").
45 Justice Stewart famously observed that he could do no better than to say, "I know it
when I see it .. " Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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is the line between permissible and impermissible religious
proclamations by the government. 46 The list goes on and on, and of
course includes the identification of racial gerrymanders in
violation of Equal Protection.4 7 None of these difficult issues of
are entirely beyond judicial
constitutional interpretation
competence pursuant to the Political Question Doctrine.
Thus, if there were this hypothetical anti-gerrymandering clause
explicitly included in the text of the Constitution, one must presume
that Chief Justice Roberts would perform his Marbury duty and
enforce it as best as he could despite whatever squeamishness he
would have given the concern that its good-faith enforcement might
nonetheless make the Court appear partisan in the eyes of the
average "man on the street." He would remind himself of all the
other categories of constitutional cases that risk making the Court
appear partisan: Separation-of-Powers cases like Zitovofsky itself or
NLRB v. Noel Canning,48 which involved Recess Appointments;
Federalism cases like Shelby County v. Holder,49 analyzing whether
the preclearance provision of the Voting Rights Act unduly intrudes
upon state sovereignty or unfairly differentiates among equally
sovereign states, or First Amendment cases like whether anti-war
protests are too inflammatory in their rhetoric, 50 or whether limits
on campaign spending improperly infringe upon rights of political
51
as decided in Citizens United v. FEC.
participation
Understanding that any and all of these constitutional cases might
cause the public to lose confidence in the Court's ability to be a
nonpartisan arbiter of constitutional requirements, Chief Justice
46 The Court famously divided, in two separate 5-4 rulings, over two different displays of
the Ten Commandments. Compare Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (affirming the
district court's preliminary injunction declaring the posting of the Ten Commandments in a
Kentucky courthouse lacked secular purpose), with McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844
(2005) (affirming the conclusion that a monolith inscribed with the Ten Commandments of
the Texas State Capitol had a valid secular purpose and did not violate the Establishment
Clause).
47 The Supreme Court recently split 5-3 on whether one of North Carolina's congressional
districts was a racial gerrymander, and in an earlier decade the Court was split 5-4 on the
same issue involving a predecessor version of the same district. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct.
1455, 1474 (2017) (upholding the district court's finding of racial predominance); Easley v.
Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 258 (2001) (reversing the district court's judgment).
- 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
49 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
50 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (offensive jacket case); see also Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning case).
51 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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Roberts nonetheless would soldier on and do his best to enforce
these constitutional requirements as faithfully and as impartially
as he is able. Consequently, if the Constitution did contain this
hypothetical anti-gerrymandering clause, Chief Justice Roberts
similarly would enforce it to the best of his impartial judicial
abilities, notwithstanding the risk that it-like other constitutional
provisions-might cause the public to wonder about the Court's
capacity for nonpartisanship in its adjudication of constitutional
cases.
In enforcing the explicit anti-gerrymandering clause, Chief
Justice Roberts undoubtedly would strive for intermediary judicial
doctrines that would maximally constrain judicial discretion in
these highly politicized cases, and he would evaluate these potential
intermediary doctrines with the aim of enabling the "man on the
street" to comprehend them and perceive them as nonpartisan.
Searching for nonpartisan and publicly accessible intermediary
doctrines in this way would be entirely appropriate and consistent
with the Court's Marbury duty. 52 It would be an endeavor to give
responsible and practical meaning to the Constitution's antigerrymandering provision; it would not be an abdication of the
Marbury duty, as judicial invocation of the Political Question
Doctrine in this context would be. As difficult and challenging as it
might be for the Court to identify the correct intermediary doctrine
for the proper enforcement of this hypothetical antigerrymandering clause, it would not be an entirely impossible task.
An explicit constitutional prohibition on partisan gerrymanders
would be susceptible to judicial implementation. The Court, for
example, could measure the perimeters of districts to see if they are
as distorted or disfigured as the original "Gerrymander" 53 and, if so,
demand that the government justify the challenged district's
aberrant shape based on geographical or other nonpartisan
grounds. (A straightforward technique for this measurement is to
compare the perimeter of the district to a circle, which is the most
geometrically compact shape; this ratio for any district then can be
compared to the same ratio for the salamander-shaped district
52 See FALLON, supra note 28, at 1 (analyzing the development of intermediary doctrines
pursuant to the Marbury power).
53 See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere & Maxwell Palmer, A Two Hundred-Year Statistical
History of the Gerrymander, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 741, 750 (2016) (depicting the salamandershaped Massachusetts State Senate district drawn in 1812 in Figure 1).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol52/iss4/5

18

Foley: Constitutional Preservation and The Judicial Review of Partisan G

2018]

CONSTITUTIONAL PRESERVATION

1123

approved in 1812 by Massachusetts governor Elbridge Gerry-the
district that generated the term Gerrymander.) 54 There might be
other ways to implement the explicit anti-gerrymandering provision
as well, but this method at least would be one. Using this method,
there would be a "judicially manageable standard" for enforcement
of this explicit anti-gerrymandering clause, and thus the Justices
would be duty-bound to enforce it pursuant to the Marbury
precedent and their judicial oaths.
B. ORIGINALISM AND AN IMPLIED PROHIBITION ON PARTISAN
GERRYMANDERS

Now, of course, the hypothetical anti-gerrymandering provision
is just that: hypothetical. There is no explicit anti-gerrymandering
provision in the federal Constitution. Thus, the Chief Justice's
concern about the Court appearing partisan if it invalidates a
gerrymander as unconstitutional arises, not with respect to the
enforcement of an explicit constitutional provision requiring the
Court to invalidate gerrymanders, but instead in the context of a
claim that a more generic constitutional provision by implication
invalidates gerrymanders.
Does this distinction make a difference? First, to be clear, insofar
as the Chief Justice's concern was about the Efficiency Gap
specifically, that concern is equally relevant-or irrelevantwhether the constitutional prohibition of partisan gerrymandering
is explicit (as with the hypothetical clause) or implicit (as it might
be if the proper interpretation of an existing constitutional clause
so entails). To reiterate from the previous section, the enforcement
of an explicit constitutional prohibition against partisan
gerrymandering need not require reliance on the Efficiency Gap as
Instead, to enforce the
an intermediary judicial doctrine.
(hypothetical) explicit anti-gerrymandering provision, the Court
could rely on a much more intuitive and straightforward
intermediary doctrine, like the rebuttable presumption of

54 Drawing upon the work of political scientists Stephen Ansolabehere and Matthew
Palmer, I have described how courts could use this straightforward technique to fashion a
judicially manageable standard for evaluating the constitutionality of modern-day
gerrymanders. See Foley, The Gerrymanderand the Constitution, supra note 10, at 14-15;
Foley, Due Process, Fair Play, and Excessive Partisanship,supra note 24, at 721 ("[I]t is
possible to measure the amount of distortion in this original gerrymandering and use that
measure as a standard by which to judge any other legislative map.").
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unconstitutionality for any district equally or more distorted in its
shape than the original Gerrymander.
This very same point, it is important to emphasize, applies just
as much if a prohibition against partisan gerrymandering is
properly implied from a more generic constitutional provision, like
the First Amendment or the Due Process Clause. Let us assume,
for the sake of argument, that a proper interpretation of the Due
Process Clause entails a "fair play" principle that renders
unconstitutional a gerrymander perpetrated, without any
geographical or other nonpartisan justification, to give one political
party an advantage in the electoral competition for legislative
seats. 55
But let us assume additionally that this proper
interpretation of the Due Process Clause tells us nothing further
methodologically about how the judiciary is supposed to identify an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.
That additional
methodological issue is left to the development of an intermediary
judicial doctrine, just as if the Constitution contained the
hypothetical explicit prohibition against a partisan gerrymander
but without any further methodological instruction on how to
identify when an unconstitutional gerrymander has occurred.
But-and this is the key point-the same methodological
alternative to the Efficiency Gap that would be available as an
intermediary doctrine to implement an explicit prohibition against
partisan gerrymanders is equally available to implement a
prohibition against partisan gerrymanders implicit in the Due
Process Clause.
More importantly, because the Political Question Doctrine is not
a valid obstacle to invocation of this methodological alternative as
an intermediary doctrine in the context of an explicit prohibition
against partisan gerrymanders, the Political Question Doctrine also
is not a valid obstacle in the context of interpreting the Due Process
Clause (or the First Amendment or another more generic
constitutional clause) to contain an implicit prohibition against
partisan gerrymanders. There is no sheer impossibility due to a
lack of any judicially manageable standards. We have already
identified a methodological alternative to the Efficiency Gap that is
unquestionably
a judicially manageable
standard: it is
straightforward for a court to measure the perimeter of a district to
5', For an extensive exploration of this argument, see Foley, Due Process, Fair Play, and
Excessive Partisanship,supra note 24, at 686-729.
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determine whether or not it is as distorted as the original
Gerrymander (and, if so, to put the government to the burden of
defending this distorted district on nonpartisan grounds). Thus, a
judicially manageable intermediary doctrine exists whether the
constitutional prohibition against partisan gerrymanders is explicit
or, instead, implicit in the Due Process Clause.
But, I can imagine Chief Justice Roberts objecting that it still
remains very much relevant that the Constitution does not contain
an explicit prohibition against partisan gerrymandering. While it
is true that the Political Question Doctrine cannot justify judicial
refusal to enforce a prohibition against partisan gerrymandering
that is implicit in a more generic constitutional clause (whether Due
Process, Equal Protection or Free Speech), it still has not been
established-at least not yet to the Chief Justice's satisfactionthat it would be proper for the Court to find an implicit prohibition
against partisan gerrymandering in a more generic clause.
Moreover, and here is the main point of contention, the fear that the
Court itself would be viewed as a partisan institution counts as a
major reason why the Court should not find an implied prohibition
against partisan gerrymandering in a more generic constitutional
clause. It is true that if the Constitution did contain an explicit
prohibition against partisan gerrymandering, the Court would be
obligated to enforce that prohibition pursuant to Marbury v.
Madison despite the concerns that the Court would appear partisan
in conducting this enforcement. 56 But as long as the Constitution
contains no such explicit prohibition, the Court cannot be compelled
to find an implicit one and thus can save itself from the risk of
appearing partisan.
This point, furthermore, is not confined to the specific
deficiencies of the Efficiency Gap. To varying degrees, it applies
whatever might be the best intermediary doctrine for enforcing a
constitutional prohibition against partisan gerrymandering,
whether that prohibition is explicit or implicit. Even the most
promising of intermediary doctrines-such as those which constrain
judicial discretion and thus minimize the risk of the judiciary
appearing partisan-cannot eliminate judicial judgment entirely.
Thus, even measuring the perimeter of a district to see if it is as
distorted as the original Gerrymander cannot reduce to zero the

56 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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possibility of a 5-4 divide among the Justices that has the
appearance of partisanship. Even after a straightforward
mathematical calculation showing a district to be more distorted
than the original Gerrymander, it would be necessary to hear the
state's asserted nonpartisan justification for this distortion, and the
Justices would need to make a judgment on the soundness of this
asserted justification. If the Justices divided 5-4 on whether the
state's asserted justification was adequately sound to sustain the
constitutionality of the district despite its distortion, and if that
division of judicial opinion fell along partisan lines, the Court would
still appear partisan in its disposition of the constitutional challenge
to the alleged gerrymander. Given that the Constitution contains
no explicit prohibition against partisan gerrymanders, this risk to
the Court's reputation for nonpartisanship in its adjudication of
constitutional claims must count as a significant reason against
finding an implicit prohibition against partisan gerrymanders.
Even so, is it a strong enough reason? To answer this question
takes one deep into constitutional theory. It requires a Justice to
consider two interrelated questions: first, how broad or narrow a
conception of "original meaning" is a Justice permitted to employ
when interpreting an open-ended constitutional clause like Equal
Protection or Due Process; and second, what should be the burden
of constitutional change, given the difficulty of adopting new
constitutional clauses through the formal amendment process of
Article V, particularly if and when constitutional change seems
necessary to safeguard the "republican form of government" that the
Constitution most fundamentally exists to foster and protect?
Debates continue to rage about the proper way to interpret the
Constitution even if one believes identifying the "original meaning"
of constitutional language is the correct approach to the
interpretative task. 57 Here is not the place for a broad exegesis on
different forms of originalism as the correct method of constitutional
interpretation. Suffice it to say that there are narrow conceptions
of "original meaning" that would preclude identifying an implicit
prohibition against partisan gerrymanders as part of the original
meaning, correctly understood, of Equal Protection, Due Process, or
other broadly phrased constitutional clauses.
These narrow
conceptions of original meaning tend to rely on what is often called

57 See generally Baude, Originalismas a Constraint on Judges, supra note 3.
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the "original expected application" of constitutional clauses,
observing that it was not widely expected at the time these clauses
were adopted that they specifically entailed a prohibition of
unconstitutional gerrymanders. 58 At the same time, however, there
are also broader conceptions of "original meaning" that would
embrace identifying an implicit prohibition against partisan
gerrymandering as an essential element of the constitutional
principle embodied in a broadly worded clause like Equal Protection
or Due Process. Equal Protection, as a concept, entails equal
opportunity of electoral participation, which further entails a
prohibition on gerrymandering, this argument might go; or Due
Process, as a concept, entails fair play, which further entails a
59
prohibition on gerrymandering, as I have argued previously.
Ultimately, a Justice must choose between a narrow or broad
conception of original meaning when interpreting a constitutional
clause. How should a Justice make this choice? One important
consideration might be the consequence to the Constitution as a
whole, and the system of government it exists to perpetuate, of
making this particular choice. 60 If adopting a narrow conception of
original meaning in a particular case significantly risks
undermining the very purpose of having the Constitution in the first
place, this risk is a strong reason for favoring the broad conception
of original meaning in that particular case. This risk weighs heavily
in favor of a broader approach to constitutional interpretation in
5 For the history of gerrymandering in the nineteenth century, and the relationship of
that history to the Fourteenth Amendment, see Foley, Due Process, FairPlay, and Excessive
Partisanship,supra note 24, at 712-15, 719-20 (noting that "[a]lthough a congressional
statute eradicating gerrymanders would have been desirable, Congress provided an
alternative foundation for a rememdy trough the Fourteenth Amendment."). See also Brief
for Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2289 (2017)
(No. 16-1161), 2017 WL 4311107.
59 In Vieth v. Jubelirer,541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004), Justice Kennedy suggested reliance on
the First Amendment as the best doctrinal basis for a constitutional constraint against
gerrymandering. For a particularly impressive account, building on that suggestion, on how
gerrymandering contravenes First Amendment principles concerning the government's
obligation to remain neutral among competing political ideas when it establishes public
forums, or other public institution, see generally Brief for American Civil Liberties Union, et.
al as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, Gill v. Whitford, (No. 16-1161), 2017 WL 3948434.
60 Alden v. Maine, 427 U.S. 706 (1999), is a quintessential example of interpreting the
Constitution structurally, to give effect to fundamental background principles and
presuppositions. The Court located the state sovereign immunity doctrine, not in any
particular constitutional clause, but instead in a background principle that was presupposed
by the Convention of 1787 itself. Id. at 779-80. See generally Ernst Young, Alden v. Maine
and the Jurisprudenceof Structure, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1601 (2000).
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this case even if the risk of the Court appearing partisan weighs in
the opposite direction.
Thus, adopting a narrow conception of original meaning would
preclude finding an implicit prohibition against partisan
gerrymanders in any of the Constitution's broadly worded clauses.
But suppose, for sake of argument, that the increasing severity of
gerrymandering in recent years-caused by technological
innovations coupled with hyperpolarization 6l-is, in fact, posing a
new and serious threat to the ongoing operation of democracy, or in
other words "a republican form of government," in America (as
many political scientists and journalistic observers are contending
with ever-accelerating alarm). 62 One possible response might be:
well, amend the Constitution to address the threat.
If the
Constitution were amended to include a new explicit prohibition
against partisan gerrymandering, then the Court would be
obligated to enforce that new explicit prohibition; until then, the
response goes, the Constitution is better served by keeping the
Court out of the partisan fray that disputes over redistricting
necessarily involve.
But is the Constitution better served by this judicial choice of a
narrow view of original meaning in this particular instance? Given
the extraordinary difficulty of amending the Constitution under
Article V, putting the burden of achieving a constitutional
61 The many amicus briefs in Gill v. Whitford refer to both the increasing sophistication of
computerized gerrymandering as well as the accelerating hyperpolarization of American
politics. See Brief of Fair Vote and One Nation One Vote as Amici Curiae in Support of
Appellees, Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct. 2289 (2017) (No. 16-1161), 2017 WL 39484423; Brief of
Amici Curiae Election Law and Constitutional Law Scholars in Support of Appellees, 137 S.
Ct. 2289 (2017) (No. 16-1161), 2017 WL 3948425; Brief for Amicus Curiae Center for Media
and Democracy in Support of Appellees, 137 S. Ct. 2289 (2017) (No. 16-1161), 2017 WL
3948426; Brief of Current Members of Congress and Bipartisan Former Members of Congress
as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees, 137 S. Ct. 2289 (2017) (No. 16-1161), 2017 WL
3948428; Brief for Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees 137
S. Ct. 2289 (2017) (No. 16-1161), 2017 WL 4311092. See also Richard Pildes, Why the Center
Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 273
(2011).
62 See, e.g., TOM MANN & NORM ORNSTEIN, IT'S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS (2012); see
also Cass R. Sunstein, Partism,2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1 (2015). Compare Lee Drutman, We
Need PoliticalParties. But Their Rabid PartisanshipCould Destroy American Democracy,
VOX
(Sept.
5,
2017),
https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/9/5/16227700/
hyperpartisanship-identity- american-democracy-problems-solutions-doom-loop,
with Uri
Friedman, Is American Democracy Really Under Threat?, THE ATLANTIC (June 21, 2017),
https://www.theat]antic.com/internationa/archive/2017/06/american-democracy-trump/530
454/.
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amendment on opponents of gerrymandering is essentially to
consign the unconstitutionality of gerrymandering to permanent
defeat.6 3 And if the increasing viciousness of gerrymandering is
eroding
severely
least
at
or
destroying,
indeed
then
States,
United
the
in
government
democratic/republican
narrowly interpreting the Constitution in this way is to undermine
it, not to preserve and protect it. In this particular instance, a
broader view of original meaning does more to sustain the most
basic purposes and goals of the Constitution itself, even if increasing
the countervailing risk that the Court itself might appear to harbor
partisan preferences (in the same way that this risk would increase
if an explicit anti-gerrymandering provision were successfully
added to the Constitution in order to bolster its most basic purpose
of fostering a democratic/republican form of government).
Neither the narrower nor broader conception of original meaning
The broader conception risks increased public
is risk-free.
perception that the judiciary itself is a partisan institution,
although this risk can be significantly minimized by adopting an
intermediary judicial doctrine that is publicly accessible and
sharply curtails the scope of judicial discretion, such as measuring
the distortion of a challenged district's perimeter in relation to the
original Gerrymander would. 64 The narrow conception, by contrast,
risks loss of public confidence in democracy itself, as voters see no
point in participating in legislative elections that have been
irredeemably "rigged" by pernicious gerrymanders.6 5 In current
circumstances, there is good reason to conclude that the greater
threat to the Constitution itself and to its fundamental purpose (its
raison ditre) is from the narrower rather than broader conception
of original meaning in this particular case.
63 For a discussion on the mechanics and difficulty in amending the United States
Constitution, see generally Connor O'Mahony, I/a Constitutionis Easy to Amend, Can Judges
be Less Restrained? Rights, Social Change, and Proposition 8, 27 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 191
(2014).
6 This historically based intermediary doctrine has the added benefit of being more easily
linked to the original understanding of the Constitution's existing clauses, for reasons I have
previously explained. Foley, Due Process, FairPlay, and Excessive Partisanship,supra note
24, at 726.
65 Public commentary on gerrymandering often complains that it causes elections to be
"rigged." See, e.g., Sarah McCammon, Redistricting Reform Advocates Say the Real 'Rigged
System' is Gerrymandering, NPR POLITICS (Mar. 18, 2017), https://www.npr.
org/2017/03/18/520551499/redistricting-reform-advocates-say-the-real-rigged-system-is-gerr
ymandering.
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C. SHELBY COUNTY, MCCUTCHEON V. FEC,AND GERRYMANDERING:
METHODOLOGICAL CONSISTENCY

For Chief Justice Roberts, this assessment of the balance
between competing constitutional risks should resonate, and
perhaps even persuade-even if it cannot be an open-and-shut case
(as is inevitably true in situations of constitutional balancing). The
Chief Justice's own jurisprudence shows similar reasoning in
comparable cases. In Shelby County, for example, the Chief Justice
wrote for the Court that the Constitution is properly interpreted to
prohibit Congress from using an obsolete formula to select some
states, but not others, for the obligation to obtain prior approval
from the federal government for changes in voting rules. 66 The
Court's decision, as the Chief Justice explained, was based on a
"fundamental principle of equal sovereignty" among the states of the
67
Union.
This equal sovereignty principle, however, is not explicit in the
text of the Constitution, but instead implicit in the same way that a
prohibition on partisan gerrymandering would be. Shelby County
concerned the congressional power to enact "appropriate
legislation" to implement civil rights, including voting rights,
protected by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 68 The
equal sovereignty principle thus operates as an implied constraint
on this explicit congressional power, based on the argument that it
would not be "appropriate" for Congress to enact a law that unduly
infringed upon the equal sovereignty of the states.6 9 But a narrower
conception of original meaning-narrower in the specific sense of
providing less room for judicial second-guessing of congressional
enactments-would hold that Congress was entitled to make its
own judgment whether differential treatment of states was
''appropriate" based on their past practices concerning voting rights.

Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556-57 (2013).
at 542 (quoting Northwest Austin v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)) (emphasis
added).
68 Id. at 536. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly provides: 'The Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment contains essentially identical
language: 'The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
69 See Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 535 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1996)).
6

67 Id.
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Moreover, the Court split 5-4 in Shelby County, with all five
Republican appointees on one side of the case and all four
Democratic appointees on the other.7 0 Consequently, the Court's
broader interpretation, to permit judicial second-guessing of
Congress based on an implicit principle of equal state sovereignty,
inevitably increased the risk that the intelligent "man on the street"
would perceive the Court's second-guessing of Congress as based on
partisan preference rather than on nonpartisan constitutional
interpretation. We can imagine ordinary citizens thinking along
these lines: "Republicans like states' rights; Democrats don't. The
Court's declaration of an implied doctrine of equal state sovereignty,
when no such doctrine is actually expressed in the document, must
reflect the Court's pro-Republican bias." This "man on the street"
assessment would be unfair to the Court's good faith effort at
impartial constitutional interpretation, but it would be no less likely
to occur as a matter of public perception than the mistaken belief
that partisanship motivated the Court's invalidation of a
gerrymander.
In Shelby County, the Court could have imposed the burden of
obtaining an explicit constitutional amendment on those wishing to
uphold the equal sovereignty of the states. In essence: "If you want
the Court to invalidate congressional civil rights laws on the ground
that those laws improperly discriminate among the states of the
Union, then you are going to have to secure an explicit
constitutional amendment prohibiting Congress from violating the
equal sovereignty of the states." That kind of response would have
been exactly equivalent to rejecting an implicit prohibition on
gerrymandering or, in an earlier era, requiring opponents of gender
discrimination to secure passage of the Equal Rights Amendment
rather than interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment to include an
implicit prohibition of gender discrimination. 71 But the Court did
70 Id. (writing for the majority was Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Republican-nominated
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito; all Democratic-nominated Justices joined
Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion).
71 In the 1970s, there was a great jurisprudential debate on whether it was appropriate for
the Supreme Court to elevate judicial scrutiny for gender discrimination claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Historically, those claims had been analyzed under rational basis
review, the lowest level of judicial scrutiny. At the same time that the Court was grappling
with this issue, states were debating whether to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA),
which would have made "sex" discrimination by governmental actors expressly
unconstitutional. One argument at the time was that the Court should not elevate scrutiny
on its own, but instead defer to the public deliberation on whether or not to adopt the Equal
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not engage in that kind of response in Shelby County, just as it had
not done so in the earlier gender discrimination cases. 72 Instead,
the Court saw the unwarranted differential treatment of the states
based on obsolete data as an affront to the fundamental federalist
structure of the Constitution, where the states were entitled to the
judicial protection of their equal sovereignty without needing to
secure a new constitutional amendment, even if this judicial
protection would increase the risk of the public perceiving the Court
as motivated by partisanship. 73
Safeguarding the core
constitutional commitment to federalism was worth the increased
risk of public misperception concerning the Court's good faith effort
at nonpartisan constitutional interpretation. Just as this kind of
constitutional calculus can justify the identification of an implied
principle of equal state sovereignty, rather than requiring a new
amendment to make that principle explicit, so too can the exact
same type of constitutional calculus justify identifying an implied
prohibition against partisan gerrymandering.
The same analysis applies to the Chief Justice's jurisprudence in
campaign finance cases, including McCutcheon v. FEC, where he
wrote the plurality opinion to justify invalidation of the
congressional ban on aggregate campaign contributions in federal
elections.7 4 Chief Justice Roberts interpreted the First Amendment
Rights Amendment. But that argument did not prevail, and the Court proceeded with
elevating scrutiny even in the wake of the ERA's inability to secure ratification in enough
states. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (striking down a male-only
admissions policy). The Court, in other words, determined that the burden of constitutional
ambiguity should not require advocates of gender equality to prevail on adoption of the ERA,
but instead should require opponents of gender equality to secure an amendment that would
repudiate a broad interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause as embracing heightened
scrutiny in gender discrimination cases.
72 See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (delivering an opinion
absent any constitutional amendment discussion).
73 See Shelby County, 570 U.S. 535 (describing the former Act's requirement for states to
obtain federal permission to pass voting laws as "a drastic departure from basic principles of
federalism").
74 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). McCutcheon is an outgrowth of the Roberts Court's vigorous
review of campaign finance regulations for incompatibility with what the majority of the
Court considers to be core First Amendment rights. The leading, and by far the best known,
of these new campaign finance precedents from the Roberts Court is Citizens United v.FEC,
558 U.S. 310 (2009). While Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in Citizens United,
Chief Justice Roberts himself added a concurrence in which he specifically explained why (in
his view) protection of the First Amendment rights at stake warranted overruling two of the
Court's precedents to the contrary, including one precedent deciding the exact same issue
from only six years earlier in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). See Citizens United, 558
U.S. at 379-84 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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as requiring the ban's invalidation because it improperly interfered
with the "right to participate in electing our political leaders," a
right he characterized as preeminent in "our democracy" (there
being "no right more basic" than this one). 75 McCutcheon was
another 5-4 split, like Shelby County, with the five Republican
appointees in the majority and the four Democratic appointees in
the dissent. Justice Thomas, while essentially agreeing with the
interpretation of the First Amendment set forth in the Chief
Justice's plurality, refused to join it because it was unwilling to
campaign
overrule the Court's precedents that treated
contributions as generally less protected from 7congressional
6
regulation than independent campaign expenditures.
A narrow interpretation of the First Amendment would have
yielded the opposite conclusion. "The freedom of speech," while
undeniably susceptible to a broader interpretation that
encompasses financial contributions to political candidates, is a
textual phrase that is also susceptible to a narrower interpretation
that excludes the transfer of money as a form of "speech"-or even
a form of expressive conduct, like the burning of a flag, that qualifies
as the equivalent of "speech" for purposes of constitutional
In this respect, the transfer of money that
protection.7 7
from an independent expenditure could
contribution
a
distinguishes
be considered as unexpressive, since such transfers often occur in
private and thus have no public communicative conduct, whereas
independent expenditures that pay for campaign advocacy are
necessarily expressive in nature.
75 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1440-41 ('There is no right more basic in our democracy
than the right to participate in electing our political leaders.").
76 See id. at 1462, 1464 (expressing a desire to overrule precedent that the plurality "chip[s]
away at all").
77 In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Supreme Court first ruled that campaign
contributions were expressive because they facilitated speech in the form of campaign
advertising and other forms of campaign messaging. But the D.C. Circuit in Buckley had
held that, while the speech facilitated by campaign contributions was undoubtedly entitled
to full First Amendment protections, the contribution itself was a form of non-expressive
conduct. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 840 (asserting that expenditures have speech
and nonspeech elements) (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)).
Many commentators have since argued that the D.C. Circuit, and not the Supreme Court,
interpreted the Constitution correctly on this basic point. See, e.g., Jessica A. Levinson, The
Original Sin of Campaign Finance Law: Why Buckley v. Valeo is Wrong, 47 U. RICH. L. REV.
881, 882-83 (2013) ("[T]he Court simply got it wrong when it concluded that spending money
is essentially the equivalent of speaking and therefore entitled to the same high level of First
Amendment protection.").
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To say that this narrower interpretation is available does not
make it correct. Still, it is worth noting that the narrower
interpretation is the one more consonant with judicial restraint: it
leaves it to the legislature to determine whether restriction on
campaign contributions, in this case a cap on aggregate
contributions,
is consistent with the functioning of a
democratic/republican form of government.
This narrower
interpretation is also the one less likely to cause the public to
perceive the Court as motivated by partisanship. If the Court
announces categorically that it is refusing to second-guess any
congressional regulation of campaign contributions, because the
Constitution, as currently written and properly interpreted, does
not permit the Court to play that second-guessing role, then the
Court could not reasonably be accused of striking down some kinds
of campaign contribution regulations while not striking down others
simply because of its own partisan preferences.
To be sure,
democracy itself might suffer-and suffer seriously-as a result of
that categorical judicial self-restraint, but the Court's own
reputation for nonpartisanship would not be put at greater risk.
This narrower interpretation of the First Amendment in
McCutcheon would have put the burden of obtaining a new
constitutional amendment on those who believe that Congress
should be constitutionally disabled from limiting aggregate
campaign contributions. In this way, the narrower interpretation
of the First Amendment in McCutcheon would be just like a
narrower interpretation of the First Amendment (and other
constitutional clauses) that requires a new constitutional
amendment in order to prevent partisan gerrymanders. But Chief
Justice Roberts was unwilling to interpret the First Amendment
narrowly in McCutcheon. The reason was that the broader
interpretation was necessary to sustain the basic right of citizens in
a democracy to seek to influence what their government does on
their behalf. In the Chief Justice's constitutional calculus, judicial
protection of this basic right was worth the risk to the Court's own
reputation for nonpartisanship.
The threat to democracy from partisan gerrymandering is at
least as real, and at least as serious, as it is from aggregate caps on
campaign contributions.
Without questioning that democracy
would suffer if Congress could insulate itself from the pressure of
public opinion in the form of campaign contributions, it is
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undeniable that democracy does suffer-along with public
perception of the capacity of elections to make a difference in what
government does-if legislatures are gerrymandered so that they
are insulated from the pressure of public opinion in the form of votes
cast in an effort to effectuate political change. 78 If it is justifiable
for the Court to adopt a broader interpretation of the First
Amendment in order to protect democracy from legislatureinsulating laws that limit campaign contributions, as Chief Justice
Roberts maintains, then it is also justifiable to adopt a broader
interpretation of the First Amendment in order to protect
democracy from legislature-insulating laws that gerrymander
districts in order to prevent changes in public opinion from
producing changes in legislative membership, and thus legislative
behavior.
Chief Justice Roberts should find this analysis persuasive. He
should recognize that there is no fundamental distinction between
the method of constitutional interpretation he employed in both
Shelby County and McCutcheon and the method of constitutional
interpretation that would lead to judicial invalidation of partisan
gerrymanders-at least if that method of interpretation employed a
straightforward intermediary doctrine of the type I have identified,
whereby the Court simply compares the distortion of the challenged
district's perimeter with the distortion of the original Gerrymander,
which the judgment of history had condemned as canonically
inconsistent with the proper functioning of democratic/republican
government in America.
D. APPLICATION OF THIS ORIGINALIST/PRESERVATIONIST
METHODOLOGY TO THE MARYLAND CASE
79
The Maryland case in the Supreme Court, Benisek v. Lamone,
is a particularly good one for undertaking this method of
Some of the districts in Maryland's current
interpretation.
congressional map are among the most egregiously distorted when
78 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymanderingand Political Cartels, 116 HARv. L. REV.
593, 606 (2002) (asserting the primary harm of gerrymandering is that it "skews the incentive
structures operating to ensure the accountability of elected representatives to shifts in the
preferences of the electorate").
79 See Benisek v. Lamone, SCOTUSBLOG: CASE FILES, http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/caseslbenisek-v-lamone (last visited Apr. 15, 2018) (archiving the proceedings and orders
in the Benisek v. Lamone case leading up to its oral argument before the Supreme Court on
March 28 2018).
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The plaintiffs in the Maryland case, regrettably, did not pursue
this straightforward method of constitutional interpretation.
Instead, focusing on one of the less distorted districts in Maryland's
current congressional map, the Sixth, they argue that this
particular district is unconstitutional because its current shape
reflects retaliation against Republican voters in the previous
version of the district.8 3 But this retaliation theory is entirely at
odds with the function of redistricting after each decennial census:
to make new districts suitable for the current demographic
conditions of the state, consistent with the overriding obligation
that all the districts be essentially equal in population.8 4 Given
these basic redistricting objectives, voters who were electorally
successful in a previous map based on a previous census cannot
complain just because they no longer have the electoral advantage
they once had. As long as the new map complies with one-personone-vote, there must be something wrong with the new map beyond
the mere fact that these affiliated voters are no longer a majority in
their new district whereas they were a majority previously.
To consider an obvious example, if Party A's voters unjustifiably
were a majority in District X because the old map was itself a
partisan gerrymander, then it would not be problematic
"retaliation" for the new map to take away that unjustifiable
majority. This point, indeed, is the same one that defeated the
85
particular partisan gerrymandering claim in LULAC v. Perry.
There, Justice Kennedy explained that one could not know whether
the intent to increase the number of seats in a congressional map
for one particular party was a wrongful gerrymander unless one had
a theory of what made drawing a district in a partisan way
wrongful; if increasing one party's seats in the new map was just
undoing an unjustified partisan gerrymander that previously gave

83 See Brief for Appellants at 29, Benisek v. Lamone, No. 17-333 (Jan. 22, 2018), https://
14 10 0
22 5
2
-Brief.pdf
www.supremecourt.gove/DocketPDF/17/17-333/28717/ 01801 1 20
(arguing "that the 2011 gerrymander has.., dictated subsequent electoral outcomes in the
Sixth District...").
84 In Wesberry v. Sanders, 316 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964), the Supreme Court articulated the
constitutional obligation to draw equally populous congressional districts every ten years.
85 See League of United Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 423 (2006) (disagreeing with
the appellants' claims that a legislature's decision to override court-drawn mid-decade
districting plans is enough to identify an unconstitutional and politically-motivated
gerrymander).
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too many seats to the opposing party, then there was nothing
inherently wrong with the partisan motive of restoring balance
underlying the new map.8 6 It is surprising that the plaintiffs in the
Maryland case are making the same mistake as the plaintiffs in
LULAC.
It is not constitutionally problematic just because
Maryland's mapmaker wanted to put more Democrats in the Sixth
District, or even to make it easier for Democrats to win the Sixth
District than previously.
What would, or should, be
unconstitutional, however, is if Maryland's mapmaker distorted the
Sixth District's shape (or the shape of any other district in the map)
in a way that cannot be justified on geographical or other
nonpartisan grounds, but instead distorted the district's shape in
order to give Democrats an unjustifiable competitive advantage that
would not exist in a map drawn to achieve geographical or other
legitimate goals.
Thus, the Court should use the Maryland case not to vindicate
the plaintiffs' mistaken "retaliation" theory, but instead to
articulate an appropriate distortion-focused approach that directly
addresses what was wrongfully undemocratic about the original
Gerrymander and is equivalently wrong about any modern
legislative district that is equally and unjustifiably distorted.
Adopting this approach would require a remand in the Maryland
case, which would have been necessary anyway given the case's
procedural posture, coming to the Court at the preliminary
injunction stage of the proceedings.8 7 This remand, moreover,
would set the correct constitutional standard not just for the
Maryland case, but for all other current or future districts
challenged as a partisan gerrymander in violation of the First
and/or Fourteenth Amendments.
But if Chief Justice Roberts is not comfortable with this approach
to the Maryland case, there is another approach that he-and the
Court as a whole-should consider. It is an approach that even
further reduces the risk that the Court itself would appear partisan
by invalidating a map as a gerrymander. Therefore, insofar as this

86 Justice Kennedy explained: "a successful claim attempting to identify unconstitutional
acts of partisan gerrymandering must do what appellants' sole-motivation theory explicitly
disavows: show a burden, as measured by a reliable standard, on the complainants'
representational rights." Id. at 418.
87 The three-judge district court denied a preliminary injunction. Benisek v. Lamone, 266
F. Supp. 3d 799 (D. Md. 2017).
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risk remains a paramount concern for the Chief Justice, this
alternative approach is one that especially warrants his attention.
III. THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE, INSTITUTIONAL FORBEARANCE, AND

JUDICIAL MODESTY
Justice Kennedy closed his concurrence in Vieth with this
observation about the importance of forbearance in a democracy:
"The ordered working of our Republic, and of the democratic
process, depends on a sense of decorum and restraint in all branches
of government, and in the citizenry itself."' 8 He lamented that the
legislature had not exhibited the necessary restraint when it had
undertaken the decennial redistricting on the state's congressional
map. But he saw no basis for judicial intervention to rectify this
lack of legislative restraint, because no one had yet provided a
"workable" standard for judicial line drawing to distinguish
89
unconstitutional gerrymanders from permissible redistricting.
The necessity of forbearance to democracy is an idea at the heart
of an important and much-heralded new book, How Democracies
Die, by the Harvard political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel
Ziblatt. 90 Written as a response to the election of Donald Trump,
and addressing whether his election represents a real threat to the
ongoing functioning of democracy in the United States, the book
argues that his election is symptomatic of much deeper and
disturbing trends-although the authors are careful to avoid being
overly alarmist about the degree to which the U.S. is in danger of
losing its democracy. 9 1 One of the most significant and worrisome
trends that the authors observe is the erosion (during the last
several decades) of "institutional forbearance," which they define as

88 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 316 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).

89Id. at 317.
90 STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATLr, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE (2018).

For reviews and

commentary on the new book, see Christian Caryl, Can American Democracy Withstand Its
Latest Assault?, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.comloutlook/can4 7
36
48 9 4-f 8 -1 le7-beb6-c8d
american-democracy-withstand-its-latest-assault/2018/01/10/7d
Democracy Survive
Will
Szalai,
48830c54d-story.html?utmterm=.196c8fe92916; Jennifer
President Trump? Two New Books Aren't So Sure, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/01/10/books/review-trumpocracy-david-frum-how-democracies-die-stevenlevitsky-daniel-ziblatt.html.
91 See generally LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 90.
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"the idea that politicians should exercise restraint in deploying their
92
institutional prerogatives."
Levisky and Ziblatt specifically identify redistricting as one area
in which the norm of institutional forbearance has suffered serious
erosion in recent years. In fact, they cite the 2003 Texas map which
was the subject of litigation for the Supreme Court in LULAC v.
Perry as "pure hardball," where one party would not even wait until
the new census at the end of the decade to redraw the state's
congressional lines to give that party an extra advantage. 93 And as
an especially acute example, they point to the wholesale collapse of
forbearance that has occurred in North Carolina since its
gubernatorial election in 2016, producing something of a
constitutional crisis in the state as well as a newly gerrymandered
congressional map that is now the subject of litigation in the
94
Supreme Court.
But there is something of a conundrum in pointing to
redistricting litigation to exemplify the erosion of institutional
forbearance in America, and it is indicated by Justice Kennedy's
own lamentation at the close of his Vieth concurrence. As Levitsky
and Ziblatt define forbearance, they emphasize the point that it is
"the action of restraining from exercising a legal right." 95 Indeed, it
is the entitlement to undertake the action that is critical to the
quality of self-restraint in decliningto undertake what one is legally
entitled to do. The authors elaborate: "Where norms of forbearance
are strong, politicians do not use their institutional prerogatives to
the hilt, even if it is technically legal to do so, for such action could
imperil the existing system." 96 Or, as they put it in yet another
passage, "institutional forbearance can be thought of as avoiding
actions that, while respecting the letter of the law, obviously violate
97
its spirit."
Defined this way, there is an obvious problem with going to court
and asking a judge to enjoin a legislature for breaching the norm of
institutional forbearance. As long as the legislature is doing what
Id. at 8-9.
93 Id. at 154.
94 Id. at 211. The Court granted a stay of the district court's invalidation of the state's
map.
Rucho v. Common Cause, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/rucho-v-common-cause/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2018).
95 LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 90, at 106.
96 Id. (emphasis added).
91 Id. (emphasis added).
92
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it is legally entitled to do-acting within the letter of the law-then
the judge is not in a position to stop the legislature from doing it.
Even if the legislature should not be doing what it is doing-even if,
in other words, the legislature ought to be engaging in self-restraint
and foregoing the opportunity to exercise its "institutional
prerogatives to the hilt"-the judge is empowered only to stop the
legislature from acting unlawfully, from disobeying the law. One
can sense the frustration that Justice Kennedy felt that he was not
empowered to require the legislature to exercise forbearance, that
he could only invalidate a map if it was shown to be unlawful and,
absent such a showing based on a "workable" judicial standard, he
was obligated to let the legislature breach the norm of forbearance
even if the legislature's doing so seriously threatened the ongoing
98
operation of democracy.
This is frustrating, yes, but seemingly unavoidable. There
appears to be a sharp dichotomy, one that is unbridgeable. If a
redistricting map is to be judicially invalidated, the map must be
actually unlawful-entirely beyond legislative power-and not
Conversely, if a
merely a breach of the forbearance norm.
redistricting map is only a breach of the forbearance norm, and not
actually beyond the scope of the legislature's legal prerogatives,
then it cannot be judicially invalidated, and that is true no matter
how distasteful or undemocratic the breach of the norm might be.
According to this dichotomy, the judiciary has no power to
invalidate a breach of the forbearance norm itself, and the judiciary
lacks this power however deleterious to democracy the breach may
be.
This dichotomy seems sound. But is it? Upon further reflection,
is it possible that there may be room in constitutional jurisprudence
for judicial invalidation of gerrymandering on the ground that it is
a breach of forbearance? This question is what this Section will
explore.
A. FORBEARANCE AND THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE

The Constitution gives Congress the power to set the procedures
for congressional elections, but lets states determine these
procedures in the absence of congressional legislation. 99 This
98 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 316 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
99 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl.1.
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Elections Clause undoubtedly lets Congress draw the congressional
districts itself or to set the rules for drawing these districts,
including empowering an independent nonpartisan redistricting
commission to undertake this task. 100 It is only because Congress
has not exercised this authority that state legislatures currently
have the power to draw congressional maps.
One might think that the either-or character of the Elections
Clause-either Congress writes the rules or the states do-leaves
no room for a judicial role. But that is not necessarily the case. The
courts would interpret any statutes that Congress enacted pursuant
to the Elections Clause.10 1 Likewise, the courts interpret any state
laws enacted pursuant to the Clause. Furthermore, even in the
absence of congressional legislation, the courts can review state
laws to determine whether or not those state laws are
fundamentally antithetical to the values of the clause itself. 102
In this respect, the Elections Clause is directly analogous to the
Commerce Clause, or at least it should be so understood. The
Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate interstate
commerce, but in the absence of such congressional regulations the
states may enact laws concerning interstate commerce. 10 3 But those
state laws must not be inconsistent with the fundamental values of
the Commerce Clause itself. If they are, then the federal judiciary
will invalidate those state laws even in the absence of specific
congressional legislation that those state laws violate. 104 This
judicial invalidation of state laws that are contrary to the
fundamental values of the Commerce Clause itself, without being
contrary to any Act of Congress, is what is commonly called
100 Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2652,
2670-71 (2015) (holding that "the Elections Clause permits the people of Arizona to provide
for redistricting by independent Commission.").
101See, e.g., Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, 570 U.S. 1, 15 (2013) ("[T]he fairest
reading of the statute is that a state-imposed requirement of evidence of citizenship not
required by the Federal Form 'is inconsistent with' the NVRA's mandate ... If this reading
prevails, the Elections Clause requires that Arizona's rule give way." (internal quotations
omitted)).
102 See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (holding that the Elections
Clause
authorized the Court's review of state congressional apportionment laws). See also Richard
Pildes, The Constitution and Political Competition, 30 Nova L. Rev. 253 (2006) (arguing that
the Elections Clause constrains uncompetitive gerrymanders, although not articulating a
"dormant" Elections Clause theory).
103 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
104 See, e.g., H.P Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 545 (holding that New York's
selective license grants violated the Commerce Clause).
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"Dormant Commerce Clause" jurisprudence (or sometimes known
as the "Negative Commerce Clause") and has existed for over 150
105
years.
But, despite the judicial invalidation of a state law because of
inconsistency with the Commerce Clause, Congress has the last
word. Congress can resurrect the invalidated state law with a new
federal statute declaring the state law to be compatible with
congressional regulation of interstate commerce. 10 6 This ability of
Congress to resurrect an invalidated state law in this way shows
that the state law was not unconstitutional in the ordinary sense of
that term. Unconstitutional state laws require a constitutional
amendment in order to be resurrected (unless the judiciary
overturns its precedent that ruled the state law unconstitutional).
Congress cannot resurrect an unconstitutional state law. A myriad
Consider Brown v. Board of
of examples prove this point.
Education, ruling unconstitutional state laws that segregated
Congress had no power to validate that
public schools. 10 7
segregation, even if the Dixiecrats who held such power in the
Senate at the time could have secured enough votes for an Act of
Congress to that effect.
Dormant Commerce Clause rulings are different. They are,
emphatically, not constitutional rulings, or at least constitutional
rulings in the conventional sense.10 8 Instead, they are rulings in aid
of Congress's plenary jurisdiction over interstate commerce. They
105 Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence has undergone major transformations, and
one recent recounting sees the doctrine in decline. Daniel Francis, The Declineof the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 94 DENV. U. L. REV. 255, 318 (2017). My own judgment is that the latest
changes to the doctrine are better understood as necessary pruning of prior overzealousness,
causing the doctrine to return to its appropriately anti-protectionist roots. See Catherine
Gage O'Grady, Targeting State ProtectionismInstead of InterstateDiscriminationUnder the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 571, 575 (1997). The Court's most recent
Dormant Commerce Clause decision is Comptroller of Treasury of the Maryland v. Wynne,
135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015), where a 5-4 vote majority invalidated a state tax as having "the same
economic effect as a state tariff, the quintessential evil targeted by the dormant Commerce
Clause." Id. at 1792. For a resounding defense of the Court's decision, especially the economic
analysis underlying it, see generally Michael S. Knoll & Ruth Mason, The Economic
Foundationof the Dormant Commerce Clause, 103 VA. L. REV. 309 (2017).
10e See Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 472 U.S.
159, 174 (1985) ("When Congress so chooses, state actions which it plainly authorizes are
invulnerable to constitutional attack under the Commerce Clause.").
107 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
108 See Michael S. Greve, The Dormant Coordination Clause, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC
269, 270 (2014) (noting that some have attacked the dormant Commerce Clause as lacking
constitutional foundations).
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are judicial determinations that a state has acted in a way contrary
to what Congress presumably would want, given the reason for
giving Congress the power over interstate commerce in the first
place. 10 9 But precisely because Congress has that plenary power
over interstate commerce, it gets to override that presumption if it
decides that the judiciary ruled incorrectly in invalidating the state
law as contrary to the (dormant) Commerce Clause. 110
Structurally, the Elections Clause can-and should-work in
exactly the same way.11 1 If a state enacts a law that undermines
the holding of congressional elections in that state, a cause of action
should exist in federal court to permit the enjoining of that state law
at least until such time as Congress can act to regulate the matter
itself. Suppose, to take an extreme example, a state passed a law
refusing to put the names of congressional candidates on its
November ballot, or providing that the polls would be open for only
one hour to cast votes for congressional candidates while otherwise
being open all day to cast ballots for all the state elections. Without
waiting for Congress to act, a federal court could issue an injunction
to prevent this kind of state subversion of the congressional election
as being inconsistent with the very premise of the Elections Clause,
109 Id. at 271.
110 Theoretically, Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence can be understood as a
carefully circumscribed form of what Henry Monaghan called "constitutional common law."
See id. (citing Henry Paul Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term Foreword:
ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. (1975)).
I" The Supreme Court first recognized the "parallel" relationship of state and federal
legislative power under both the Elections Clause and Commerce Clause in Ex Parte Siebold,
100 U.S. 371 (1880). The Court observed that the key point was "the concurrent authority of
the two sovereignties, State and National, over the same subject-matter." Id. at 384-85. In
explaining how this concurrent authority works, the Court continued: 'In the absence of
congressional regulation, which would be of paramount authority when adopted [state
legislation is] valid and binding" as long as it is consistent with the "national character" of
"inter-state commerce." Id. at 385. By contrast, when circumstances dictate, because a state
law is contrary to the free trade across state borders that is the purpose of the Commerce
Clause, the state law must yield even if there is no congressional legislation on point. "So in
the case of laws for regulating the elections of representatives to Congress," the Siebold Court
continued, thereby recognizing that a state regulation of congressional elections would be
invalid-even in the absence of congressional legislation on point-if the nature of the state
regulation subverted the essential function of congressional elections. Id. at 386. For
emphasis, the Court added:
It is the duty of the States to elect representatives to Congress. The due and
fair election of these representatives is of vital importance to the United
States.
Id. at 388. A breach of that duty surely is remediable, even if Congress has not yet legislated
in a way to counteract the breach.
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which empowers states to facilitate and not subvert congressional
elections. 112 In this way, the Elections Clause necessarily has a
"dormant" component analogous to the Commerce Clause: state
laws that undermine congressional elections are inconsistent with
the Elections Clause even without a new Act of Congress aimed at
undoing those state laws, and the judicial power exists to enjoin
those antithetical state laws even in the absence of congressional
legislation that directly preempts them.
Judicial invalidation of a state law on "dormant" Elections
Clause grounds, like "dormant" Commerce Clause grounds, is
appropriately subject to congressional revision without need for a
constitutional amendment. If the Court were to hold that a state
law providing for fewer voting hours to cast a congressional ballot
compared to longer voting hours for state office ballots was contrary
to the Elections Clause, but then Congress subsequently were to
approve this kind of differential treatment, the Court necessarily
would acquiesce given Congress's ultimate authority to regulate the
procedures for congressional elections. This need for the Court to
acquiesce, moreover, does not mean that the Court was wrong to
enjoin the state law initially. While Congress retains plenary
authority over policy in this area and thus can authorize the state's
apparent hostility to facilitating the exercise of popular sovereignty
in congressional elections, in the absence of such explicit
congressional authorization, the Court is warranted in presuming
that such hostility is antithetical to the very existence of the
Elections Clause and the popular sovereignty it is designed to
Thus, the Court best preserves the original
implement.
understanding and purpose of the Elections Clause by enjoining the
state law hostile to the holding of congressional elections while
standing ready to dissolve the injunction in light of subsequent
congressional regulation. In this way, a "dormant" Elections Clause
ruling is not an exercise of the Marbury v. Madison power, which
would require a constitutional amendment to overrule, but instead
an appropriate auxiliary to congressional legislation pursuant to
the Elections Clause.

112 In Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587 (M.D.N.C. 2018), the three-judge
district court recognized that the Elections Clause imposes a constraint on state laws even in
the absence of directly preemptive congressional legislation.
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B. APPLICATION OF THE DORMANT ELECTION CLAUSE THEORY

The Court could use this "dormant" Elections Clause theory to
invalidate state laws that gerrymander congressional districts
while simultaneously permitting Congress itself to retain the
ultimate power to approve those districts if Congress so chooses.
State laws that gerrymander congressional districts so that a
political party is able to retain power despite the electorate's shift
in views and desire to remove that party from power are subversive
of the Elections Clause's original purpose.
Indeed, these
gerrymanders are inconsistent with the original understanding that
elections to the federal House of Representatives would be directly
responsive to the periodically changing views of the electorate.11 3
The Court thus would be warranted in enjoining those
gerrymanders as antithetical to the fundamental value of popular
sovereignty embodied in the Elections Clause. Yet this injunction
on Elections Clause grounds would preserve Congress's ultimate
authority to control congressional districting, including approval of
districts criticized as gerrymanders but that Congress itself accepts
as legitimate. No judicial invalidation of a state's congressional
map as a partisan gerrymander would be "frozen" as a ruling
unalterable except by constitutional amendment.
Instead,
Congress could simply do what it had the power to do all along:
enact whatever laws it wished concerning the drawing of
congressional districts. In the meantime, however, it would be a
good thing-it would be preservative of the Constitution's original
meaning and purpose-for the Court to stand vigilant, prepared to
enjoin state laws that seem so clearly inimical to the very idea of
holding congressional elections in a way consistent with "a
republican form of government."
This dormant Elections Clause approach to congressional
gerrymanders alleviates the concern, as expressed by Chief Justice
Roberts, that the Court would intrude inappropriately on legislative
turf if it invalidated a redistricting map as unduly partisan.
113 In Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587 (M.D.N.C. 2018), the court reviewed
the original debates over the Elections Clause to show the Clause's paramount objective of
making sure that elections to the House of Representatives were responsive to the political
sentiments of the electorate. For example, the court quotes Madison as saying that "it is
particularly essential that the [House of Representatives] should have an immediate
dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people." Id. at 620 (citing THE
FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison).
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Whereas a ruling on First Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment
grounds would prevent Congress from revisiting the Court's
judgment concerning the redistricting map, not so with respect to a
ruling on dormant Elections Clause grounds. Congress retains the
last word, as well as the first, and the Court speaks only when
Congress is silent if the circumstances indicate that what a state
has done is contrary to any reasonable expectation of what
congressional redistricting should look like-and thus presumably
contrary to what the so-far silent Congress would want if Congress
were exercising its Elections Clause authority to foster
congressional elections consistent with the fundamental underlying
value of popular sovereignty.
This dormant Elections Clause theory is also a way to incorporate
the idea of institutional forbearance into redistricting litigation. A
state legislature's congressional map that is enjoined on dormant
Elections Clause grounds is not beyond the scope of the state
legislature's authority; indeed, Congress could specifically confirm
the state legislature's power to enact that very map. But the
dormant Elections Clause enables the Court to declare, subject to
clarification by Congress, that the state legislature's congressional
map is an abuse of the state's legislative authority. The state
legislature did not exercise the kind of institutional forbearance
that it should have in adopting the congressional map and for this
reason the Court must enjoin use of the map unless and until
Congress expressly approves of its use.
Obviously, the Court itself must exercise great restraint in
invoking this dormant Elections Clause theory. Given the explicit
power of state legislatures to enact laws regulating congressional
elections, provided that Congress does not choose to override that
power, the Court would be interfering improperly with the
prerogatives of the state legislatures (and of Congress) if the Court
too readily invalidated these state laws. But if state legislatures
engage in the kind of extreme abuse of power that Levitsky and
Ziblatt define as a breach of institutional forbearance-where
legislatures contravene democratic norms of fair play by
endeavoring to destroy electoral competition that would permit the
electorate to alter the partisan composition of the legislature in light
of changing public opinion-then the Court is warranted in taking
the appropriately modest step of stopping the state legislature from
subverting the very purpose of it having power to regulate
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congressional elections (with Congress remaining the ultimate
arbiter of whether the state legislature had indeed engaged in an
intolerably subversive abuse of its power). 114 This limited and
carefully circumscribed judicial role helps, rather than hinders,
Congress in preserving the basic constitutional commitment to
democratic/republican
governance,
including the norm of
institutional forbearance necessary to make this constitutional
system work.
The dormant Elections Clause theory also permits the Court to
experiment with innovative statistical methodologies for detecting
partisan gerrymanders that would not be appropriate for adoption
as part of jurisprudence revisable only by constitutional
amendment. 115 The declaration that a gerrymander violates Equal
Protection or the First Amendment, given the difficulty of amending
the Constitution, has a permanence that inevitably necessitates
judicial caution before embracing any particular methodology for
identifying unconstitutional gerrymanders. To be sure, statistical
techniques can evolve even as the underlying constitutional
principle remains unchanged, and thus the Court can update the
statistical techniques while remaining unalterably faithful to the
enduring constitutional principle. 116 (An analogy would be the
114 See LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 90, at 112 (noting that when politicians think they
are going to lose elections, they can be "tempted to abandon forbearance ... [and] [t[he result
is politics without guardrails...").
115 The degree to which statistical innovation on the topic of gerrymandering has
accelerated during the last several years is astonishing and can be appreciated by comparing
the statistics introduced at trial in the Wisconsin case, Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 837, 854
(W.D. Wis. 2016), with the statistics introduced in the North Carolina case, Common Cause
v. Rucho. 279 F. Supp. 3d 587. The Gill trial was premised largely on the statistical
innovation of the Efficiency Gap measure, while the North Carolina case has included
additional measures, like the mean-median gap, and most importantly the use of computer
simulations to determine whether the challenged map is a statistical "outlier" relative to
other possible maps compliant with the government's asserted redistricting criteria. (For
details, see the court's discussion of the statistical evidence in Rucho. Id. at 665.) One of the
lead attorneys in these two cases, Professor Nicholas Stephanopoulos, has acknowledged the
importance of this ongoing statistical innovation. Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The North
Carolina Gerrymandering Trial, ELECTION LAW BLOG (Oct. 22, 2017, 9:54 PM),
https://electionlawblog.org/?p=95579; see also Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The New Wave of
Gerrymandering Scholarship-PartIII, ELECTION LAW BLOG (Sept. 27, 2017, 5:07 PM),
https://electionlawblog.org/?p=95049 (distinguish between a map's "absolute" and "relative"
favoritism towards one political party).
116 See Edward B. Foley, Of X-Rays, CT Scans, and Gerrymanders, Election Law @ Moritz
(Oct. 3, 2017, 6:32 PM), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/election-law/article/?article=13415
(comparing technological developments in the medical field to recent statistical developments
used to detect gerrymandering).
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updating of available evidence relevant to whether the imposition
of the death penalty on juvenile defendants amounts to "cruel and
unusual punishment" under the Eight Amendment. 117) Even so, the
Court should be reluctant to incorporate into Equal Protection or
First Amendment law a new form of statistics that has yet to be
tested significantly and may require substantial and rapid revision.
The dormant Elections Clause, however, is fundamentally
different in this respect. By its very nature, a dormant Elections
Clause ruling has a temporary and provisional quality lacking in
Equal Protection or First Amendment jurisprudence: it is always
subject to congressional revision. Thus, for the Court to adopt a
particular statistical methodology as part of a dormant Elections
Clause ruling is not to set that methodology into constitutional
stone. Congress, for example, could choose to revise the statistical
methodology while leaving intact other elements of the dormant
Elections Clause ruling. And even if Congress has chosen not to
change a statistical methodology adopted by the Court, in a future
dormant Elections Clause case the Court should feel entitled to
revise the methodology based on new information; after all, if
Congress prefers retaining the original methodology, it can make
that preference clear as part of its ultimate regulatory authority,
and then the Court necessarily would revert to that statistical
methodology.
Thus, the Court should feel comfortable in embracing statistics
as part of dormant Elections Clause analysis even if, as Chief
Justice Roberts expressed at the oral argument in Gill, the Court
has some discomfort with embracing certain forms of statistics as
part of conventional constitutional analysis under the First or
Fourteenth Amendments.11 8 While the Efficiency Gap may have
flaws that counsel against its use even as part of dormant Elections
Clause analysis, or at least its exclusive use, other statistical tools
would be appropriate as part of a dormant Elections Clause test for
detecting exceptionally egregious gerrymanders. For example, the
kind of "outlier" analysis explained in the Lander amicus brief in
Gill,11 9 which makes straightforward use of the common idea of a
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005), overruling Sanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361 (1989) (discussing evidence showing that society views juveniles as less culpable
than adults).
118 Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Gill v. Whitford (No. 16-1161).
119Brief for Amicus Curiae Eric S. Lander in Support of Appellees, Gill v. Whitford, 137 S.
Ct. 2289 (2017) (No. 16-1161).
117
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"normal distribution" or "bell curve," could easily be incorporated
into the dormant Elections Clause approach. 120 Far from being the
kind of "sociological gobbledygook" that worried Chief Justice
Roberts, 12 1 the idea that a map is an "outlier," defined as beyond the
range of a normal distribution of maps all compliant with a state's
professed redistricting criteria, is an idea readily comprehensible to
anyone having a rudimentary familiarity with a bell curve. 122 The
Court then could use this idea in a way understandable to the public
to say, pursuant to the Elections Clause, that an extreme outlier
map is off-limits unless and until Congress specifically authorizes
the use of a map that is so presumptively inconsistent with the
Elections Clause's fundamental goal of popular sovereignty.
23
Lander amicus brief's illustration of an outlier map 1

state 0

IV. THE EXISTING CONSTITUTION AND THE FUTURE OF THE
REPUBLIC

The U.S. Constitution is commonly acknowledged as the oldest
still-functioning written constitution in the world (thus setting
aside Britain's unwritten constitution). 124 Well into its third
120 The Lander amicus brief featured prominently at the oral argument in Gill, as I have
noted previously. See Foley, supra note 117. For a very accessible explanation of the
statistical principles underlying a normal distribution, see Normal Distribution, MATH IS
FUN, https://www. mathsisfun.comidata/standard-normal-distribution.html.
121Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Gill v. Whitford (No. 16-1161).
122Amazon even sells a t-shirt illustrating the concept of a statistical outlier beyond the tail
of a normal distribution.
Statistical Outlier, AMAZON FASHION, https://www.amazon.
com/Revelry-Tees-Statistical-Outlier/dp/B 06XZVC3JD?th=1.
123 Brief for Amicus Curiea Erick S1. Landen in Support of Appellees at 14, Gill v. Whitford,
(No. 16-1161).
124 See Constitution Rankings, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTION PROJECT (Apr. 8, 2016),

http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/ccp-rankings/ (compiling ranking statistics of the
current countries with constitutions); see also Sean Gorman, Goodlatte Says U.S Has the
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century, it may last for many more. Or it might be replaced much
sooner than expected, especially if the current effort to call a new
constitutional convention is successful-as its organizers hope for it
to be in a year. 125
However long the current Constitution lasts, it is the job of the
judiciary to preserve it pursuant to the rule of law. The enterprise
of constitutional preservation, like architectural preservation,
becomes more challenging with the passage of time. Just as a
historical building shows its age as it weathers through changes in
climate, so too the nation's foundational charter must endure the
stresses brought by new conditions and changing social
circumstances. The task of the preservationist is to maintain the
integrity of the original creation while enabling it to withstand not
just the ordinary wear-and-tear that it has suffered through the
centuries, but also the extra duress of exceptionally difficult storms
that can occur over time.
The Republic has faced far greater danger to the preservation of
its democracy-its government "of the people, by the people, and for
the people"-than what it confronts today. The Civil War, of course,
was its severest threat and most likely will always remain so. That
the Constitution withstood secession and reunion, albeit with the
no small thing
essential aid of its Reconstruction amendments, is
126
endurance.
for
capacity
and shows its remarkable
Even so, the Republic and its commitment to government "of the
people, by the people, and for the people" is again being tested today,
as is democracy throughout the world.1 27 Gerrymandering, by itself,
2014),
22,
(Sept.
POLITIFACT
Constitution,
National
Working
Oldest
2
http://www.politifact.com/virginia/statements/2014/sep/2 [bob-goodlatte/goodlatte-says-ushasoldest-working-national-cons! ("[Tihe Constitution is 'the World's longest surviving
written charter of government.").
125 See America Might See a New Constitutional Convention in a Few Years, ECONOMIST
29 73 5
-if-it-did-would-be(Sept. 30, 2017), https://www.economist.com/newslbriefmg/217
are now 27 states
('There
dangerous-thing-america-might-see-new-constitutional-convention
in which the legislatures have passed resolutions calling for a convention that would propose
a balanced-budget amendment."). Only six more states are needed, and there is a plan to
secure all six by 2019. Matt O'Connor, Wisconsin Passes Resolution Calling for Constitutional
https://badgerherald.coml
2017),
8,
(Nov.
Herald
Badger
Convention,
news/2017/11/08/wisconsin-passes-resolution-calling-for-a-constitutional-conventionI.
126 U.S. CONST. amends XIII-XV.
127 See Freedom in the World 2018: Democracy in Crisis, FREEDOM HOUSE (Jan. 16, 2018),
2
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedomworld/freedom-world- 018; see also Aziz Z. Huq &
Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a ConstitutionalDemocracy, Univ. of Chicago, Pub. Law, Working
Paper No. 642, 2017) (analyzing major risks to the structure of democracy).
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may not yet be the same existential threat to America that Fort
Sumter signaled, but if permitted to metastasize as it has over the
last decade-and when combined with other deteriorations in
democratic norms and practices-it will cause the public to lose
confidence in the possibility of self-government. 128 If that public
confidence is irretrievably lost, so too is the actual operation of
democracy, for the people must participate for it genuinely to be selfgovernment.
Thus, the preservation of the Constitution now requires a
curtailment of gerrymandering. The Court's duty is to interpret the
text of the Constitution in a way most likely to preserve its original
meaning and purpose. 129 It is obviously not a straightforward
reading of the Constitution's words that invalidates a gerrymander.
(If it were that straightforward, gerrymandering would have been
in validated long ago.) But just as the Court found that the less
straightforward reading of the text was necessary in Shelby County
to preserve the essential principle of equal state sovereignty
underlying the entire structure of the Constitution, so too is the less
straightforward reading of the text necessary to preserve the
essential republican principle that elections to the House of
Representatives must reflect government "of the people, by the
people, and for the people."
There are different ways to interpret the Constitution's text to
perform this preservationist function.
The most judicially
minimalist is the dormant Elections Clause theory elaborated in
Part III. Thus, a Justice seeking to minimize the judicial role in
congressional redistricting, while at the same time recognizing the
preservationist
obligation
to protect the Republic from
gerrymandering (insofar as it undermines popular sovereignty)
should be inclined toward the dormant Elections Clause theory-at
least in the first instance, because it leaves Congress the ultimate
arbiter of what congressional redistricting is permissible.

128 Gerrymandering is increasingly seen as a means of "rigging" elections. For example, in
its recent editorial, the LA Times condemned partisan gerrymandering because it devalues
democracy by unfairly rigging electoral maps." It's Time to Slay the Monster of Partisan
Gerrymandering, LA TIMES (Feb. 22, 2018, 4:05 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/
editorials/la-ed-gerrymandering-courts-20180222-story.html.
As with any claim that the
electoral system is "rigged," if the public believes it to be so, they will view the system and its
results unworthy of respect.
129 See supra note 1.
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With respect to the redistricting of state legislatures, the Court
could also adopt a dormant Republican Form of Government Clause
theory. Under this theory, Congress would have the ultimate power
to invalidate the redistricting map for a state legislative chamber if
Congress believed that the map entailed a gerrymander so
egregious as to deprive the state of a republican form of government.
According to the text of the clause, after all, Congress, as the federal
legislature, is obligated to guarantee each state a republican form
of government; therefore, if it were Congress's judgment that a
gerrymander subverted republican government in a particular
130
state, Congress would be obligated to nullify that gerrymander.
A dormant Republican Form of Government Clause jurisprudence
would simply have the Court assist Congress in the exercise of this
power by enjoining, subject to congressional revision, state laws
that the Court deems fundamentally antithetical to republican
(This dormant Republican Form of Government
government.
Clause jurisprudence would require a modification, although not a
complete repudiation, of Luther v. Borden and its progeny. 13 1 A
modification because the Court would not be entirely precluded
from enforcement of the clause, but only a modification because
Congress, and not the Court, would retain the ultimate authority on
the clause's enforcement.)
While retaining for Congress the ultimate constitutional power
over gerrymandering subversive of republican government-both
for congressional and state legislative districts-would minimize
the judicial role in redistricting, there remains the question of what
the Court should do if Congress itself abuses this power in a way
An
that undermines popular sovereignty in the Republic.
interpretation of the First Amendment, or Due Process Clause, that
prevents egregious gerrymanders inconsistent with republican selfgovernment would protect against this kind of congressional abuse.
But judicial minimalism would suggest keeping the possibility of
this interpretation in reserve, and relying instead in the first
instance on the dormant Elections Clause theory (and, if necessary
to thwart the egregious gerrymandering of state legislatures, on the
See Mark D. Rosen, Can Congress Play a Role in Remedying Dysfunctional Political
Partisanship?,50 IND. L. REV. 265, 271 (2016) ("Congress's power to guarantee representative
governments in the states plausibly includes the substitution of federal rules for state [rules]
that threaten the states' republican forms of government by undermining their legitimacy.").
131 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849) ("[T]he right to decide [whether a State's government is
republican] is placed [in Congress], and not in the courts.").
133
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dormant Republican Form of Government Clause theory), thereby
giving Congress a chance to act consistently with the fundamental
principle of popular sovereignty that underlies the Constitution
that "We the People" adopted.
What is not acceptable, however, consistent with the
preservationist role that the Court is required to perform under
Marbury v. Madison, is for the Court to adopt an interpretation of
the Constitution's text that permits increasingly egregious
gerrymanders to the point that popular sovereignty for elections to
the U.S. House of Representatives, or to state legislatures, no longer
exists.
V. CONCLUSION

When the Constitutional Convention of 1787 ended, Benjamin
Franklin was asked what kind of government the new Constitution
would establish. "A republic, if you can keep it," the celebrated sage
famously responded. 132 Marbury v. Madison gives the Court an
essential role in preserving the republic that the Constitution
establishes. Insofar as increasingly egregious gerrymandering
using new technologies threatens the ongoing existence of the
republican government that the Constitution aimed to establish,
then the Court is obligated to thwart this gerrymandering.
For the Court to do so might cause the Court to expend some of
its institutional capital, in terms of the public's perception of the
Court as an institution removed from politics. But this expenditure
of institutional capital in order to perform the Court's
preservationist function under Marbury v. Madison is no different
than when the Court involves itself in the political fray to invalidate
campaign finance laws that prohibit citizen engagement essential
to popular sovereignty. The judicial role under Marbury v. Madison
exists for a purpose, and that purpose is served if the Court
safeguards the republic that the Constitution created-and does so
by nullifying egregious gerrymanders that threaten to eviscerate
the republic.

1,32 Lee Ann Potter, A Republic, If you Can Keep It, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Sept. 8,
2016), https://blogs.loc.gov/teachers/2016/09/a-republic-if-you-can-keep-it].

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol52/iss4/5

50

